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Resumo 
 
Este artigo considera a relevância das concepções jurídicas de Eugen 
Ehrlich e Hans Kelsen para os debates contemporâneos sobre 
direitos humanos e seus limites. Afirma-se que as concepções de 
Ehrlich e Kelsen reforçam uma abordagem multifacetada do Direito e, 
ao mesmo tempo, asseguram a autonomia humana e a liberdade em 
face das "grandes narrativas" e das intervenções governamentais. 
Essa perspectiva abre uma variedade de oportunidades para uma 
melhor compreensão do equilíbrio entre os interesses individuais e 
coletivos, entre o significado dos direitos e a soberania. Ambas as 
concepções são ainda atuais para os debates nos campos do Direito 
Internacional, do Direito Constitucional e da Filosofia do Direito sobre 
os limites dos direitos humanos e sobre as condições epistêmicas de 
identificação destes direitos, de compreensão de como esses direitos 
são e, ao mesmo tempo, podem reivindicar um caráter universal, 
permanecendo culturalmente incorporados. O princípio e o valor da 
relatividade que sustentam a Teoria Pura do Direito de Kelsen e a 
Sociologia do Direito de Ehrlich são de particular importância para a 
discussão da “universalidade relativa” dos direitos humanos. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the relevance of the legal conceptions of Eugen 
Ehglich and Hans Kelsen for the contemporary debates on human 
rights and on their limits. It is asserted that the conceptions of Ehrlich 
and Kelsen enhance a multifaceted approach to the law and, at the 
same time, such philosophical perspective that secures human 
autonomy and freedom from “great narratives” and governmental 
interventions. This perspective opens a variety of opportunities for 
better understanding of the balance between individual and collective 
interests, between the significance of rights and sovereignty. Both 
conceptions are still actual for the debates in the fields of international 
or constitutional law, and legal philosophy about the limits of human 
rights and about epistemic conditions for identifying these rights, for 
understanding how these rights are the same time can claim for a 
universal character and remain culturally embedded. The principle 
and the value of relativity that underpins the Pure Theory of Law of 
Kelsen and the legal sociology of Ehrlich are of particular importance 
for discussing the “relative universality” of human rights. 
 
Key-words: Constitutionalization. Eugen Ehrlich. Hans Kelsen. 
Human Rights. Legal Sociology. Normativity. Pure Theory of Law. 
Social Conventions. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the debates about human rights referring to the conceptions of Hans Kelsen or 
Eugen Ehrlich sometimes is taken as eccentric or even ridiculous, because these 
thinkers and their ideas are considered to be obsolete and of no value for the 
contemporary legal problems.2 Naturally, neither of these two thinkers (Ehrlich died in 
1922 and Kelsen  in 1973) could anticipate the future development of societies and 
the legal problems arising in this development. We take these two conceptions (leaving 
aside other thinkers whose works can be of no lesser importance) as the most 
illustrative for the positivist approach to law in the first half of the XXth century and as 
still influential nowadays (at least, in the continental jurisprudence). Our objective is to 
demonstrate that the both conceptions offer a rich potential for discussing limits of 
human rights, although indirectly  through particular methodological ideas favouring 
autonomy and freedom of individuals.  
Even if these legal scholars diverged significantly on some points, and represent 
two different legal theories (analytical jurisprudence and sociological jurisprudence), 
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 See detailed accounts on such views: TREVINO, 2013, p. 26-47; SOMEK, 2007, p. 409-451.  
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there are two major dimensions that bring these them together. Their conceptions were 
formulated to meet the same epistemic challenges that legal science faced in the first 
decades of the XXth century, and both Kelsen and Ehrlich sought to work out such a 
pluralistic understanding of law that would take a better account of relativity of legal 
knowledge. This led Kelsen and Ehrlich to methodological pluralism which was reflected 
in value pluralism to which both legal scholars adhered. Substantially, such pluralism 
favoured personal choice both in the epistemic and axiological aspects, and promoted 
democracy where human beings were considered to be autonomous authors of the 
rules by which is governed their behaviour. For both thinkers the law is created not by 
the state or any metaphysical instances, but by human beings themselves: for Kelsen it 
is judges and lawyers who create legal rules, and for Ehrlich it is members of various 
social communities that bring about the real legal regulation. From this vantage point, 
Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law and Ehrlich’s sociology of law are not hostile to human 
freedom and, on the contrary, empirical facts (for sociological jurisprudence) or formal 
normativity (for analytical jurisprudence) can have more beneficent effect than eloquent 
diatribes about such ideal dimensions of the law as justice or proportionality. After 
analyzing the main challenges to legal knowledge and the responses Kelsen and 
Ehrlich tried to formulate to meet these challenges, we will assess the main points at 
which the intellectual legacy of these legal thinkers can be important for the 
contemporary debates about correlation between human rights and sovereign rights of 
states. 
 
2. PROBLEMATIZING THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE IN LEGAL SOCIOLOGY AND IN 
NORMATIVISM 
 
Human rights are one of the most controversial and the same time stimulating 
topics for the contemporary legal philosophy. In the scope of the on-going debates 
some thinkers tend to assert the supreme value of these rights which are supposed to 
be independent on any authoritative enactment and to serve as ultimate criteria for 
assessing validity of legislation.(HAAS, 2008) Some thinkers, on the contrary, may 
admit that there are no rights before their positivation in statutes and international 
treaties, or even if such rights are existent, their effect is weak, unsatisfactory and 
dependent on political arrangements.(POSNER, 2014) There are a variety of 
intermediate conceptions searching for a solution of this issue in-between these two 
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extremities. (ISHAY, 2004, p. 359-373) In the light of this variety it could appear to be a 
vain undertaking to formulate even a preliminary philosophical conception of human 
rights that pretends to encompass and to reconcile all the existing variations in 
understanding of nature and limits of fundamental rights. (HAFNER-BURTON; 
TSURTSUI, 2007, p. 396-426)  
To a large extent, in the contemporary debates “human rights” became one of 
the “essentially contested notions” (GALLIE, 1956, p. 167-198) that is impossible to 
exhaustively define and that at the same time is unavoidable for every discourse about 
legal rights and obligation (ALLAN, 2014). This state of affairs allows referring to human 
rights in order to legitimize almost any political program or judicial decision, which can 
benefit from weighting and balancing and which thus can acquire legitimate, binding 
effect(ALEXY; KOCH; KUHLEN; RUSSMANN, 2013). It is often asserted that in order 
to procure this effect, acts of weighting and balancing will always yield the only one right 
answer (DWORKIN, 1985) that is (claims to be) objectively correct (ALEXY, 2010, p. 
20-32) and that thereby rules out all other solutions. However, adopting a more 
sceptical perspective, it is possible to argue that this approach finally hinges on certain 
subjective convictions and cannot be therefore really objective(BULYGIN, 2000a, p. 
133-137). This objection indirectly undermines the supposedly universal value of human 
rights making them dependent on political endorsement (BULYGIN, 2000b, p. 175-181). 
If we approach this issue in another perspective, we can also discover opposite 
opinions as to whether human rights are a new word for the old idea of natural or supra-
legislative law serving as a set of values that allows passing judgments on (absence of) 
binding force of certain positive enactments of state authorities(MOYN, 2010). It is 
equally possible to admit that human rights are a substantially new idea that reflects a 
new morality of mankind which after the atrocities of the Second World War cannot 
tolerate serious infringements on basic rights and freedoms any longer (BERNSTROFF, 
2008, p. 903-924). This discussion is undoubtedly important and its mere description 
would require a lengthy scientific article. However, the question about limits of human 
rights can, in our opinion, be answered without referring to the post-war debates and 
treaties about human rights. That is why, here we can put these debates aside, without 
contending that they are inutile or have less importance for other research purposes. 
Anyways, these debates did not emerge from nothing and there surely have been some 
furrows ploughed on the field of human rights already in the pre-war legal philosophy 
(BUERGENTHAL, 2004, p. 783-807).  
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Quite a lot of literature is dedicated to the pre-war proponents of natural-law 
doctrines who are traditionally considered to be inspirers and supporters of human-
rights discourse in the first half of the XXth century (PAULSON, 1995, p. 489-500). Just 
after the war had been finished in 1945, Gustav Radbruch threw down the gauntlet to 
legal positivists, vehemently accusing them of their servility and incapacity to fight the 
“statutory injustice” because of the “Gesetz ist Gesezt” principle. Radbruch’s 
accusations were turned foremost against the proponents of the first positivism in the 
style of John Austin who identified the law with the commands of a sovereign (AUSTIN, 
1995).3 But Radbruch’s critical remarks were taken in much broader sense  they were 
uncritically expanded by human-rights activists onto all those who shared the positivist 
account of law (those who admit that the law is a set of posited social rules whose 
validity is independent on value judgments) (MAIHOFER, 1962) (KAUFMANN, 1988, p. 
1629-1634) (OTT; BUOB, 1993, p. 91-104) (LIPPMAN, 1997, p. 199-308) (ALEXY, 
2002). It became one of the common places in the philosophical literature to blame 
followers of sociological and analytical jurisprudence for their alleged readiness to 
tolerate any infringements on human rights, because for true legal positivists human 
rights are supposedly always trumped by the state sovereignty (SCHEIPERS, 2009).  
This accusation is, nonetheless, far from being justified. As a matter of fact, most 
of the positivist-minded legal philosophers did not take seriously the Austin-styled 
command theories of law already in the first decades of the XXth century, and by that 
time Gezetzespositivismus had lost almost all of its allure because of the 
insurmountable epistemological complications in explaining what sovereign’s will is and 
how it can be accurately established (KELSEN, 1992).  
Curiously enough, it is the legal positivists such as Hans Kelsen who by their 
relentless criticism of the command theories stripped these theories of scientific value in 
the eyes of, at least, many German lawyers. In a series of his pre-war works and 
especially in the first edition of his Pure Theory of Law (1934) Kelsen has demonstrated 
that law is constantly reinterpreted and therefore reformulated at every stage of its 
application; and from this standpoint the law-creation is at the same time the law-
application. In his view, the “Gesetz ist Gesezt” principle should be understood as an 
ideological tool, suited to the naïve ideals of the Enlightenment and having nothing to 
do with the machinery of real legal orders. The law cannot be a simple instruction 
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issued by a sovereign; it is a dynamic process of regulation engaging every judge and 
every law-enforcement officer and making every such judge or officer responsible for 
the final outcome of the application of the law (KELSEN, 1956, p. 597-620). This topic 
has been famously discussed also in the Hart-Fuller post-war debates about validity of 
the Nazi statutes and responsibility of those who had inexorably applied them 
(HART,1958, p. 593-629. ; FULLER, 1958, p. 630-672) (KELSEN, 1947, p. 153-171).  
The command theories of law suffered also from the criticism of sociologically 
minded legal scholars. To a considerable extent, Eugen Ehrlich has conceived his 
Fundamental Principles of the Legal Sociology in 1913 as an attempt to divulge and 
dismantle the false ideologies behind the first legal positivism (EHRLICH, 2002). Law 
cannot be taken as exclusively a product of lawmakers’ will or as a simple command  
law exists as a social phenomenon, so that the existing social environment prefigures 
creation and application of the law, and thereby sets out constraints for lawmaking and 
judicial organs.  
However, this sociological approach is quite multifaceted. Among other trends, it 
gave also the birth to a series of utterly conservative ideologies, such as the conception 
of Rechtserneuerung which legitimized reinterpretation of statutory law in the light of 
people’s presumed feelings of justice but often contrary to the literal meaning of the 
interpreted statutes (RUETHERS, 2004). Paradoxically, the Nazi legal ideologists, such 
as Karl Larenz (LARENZ, 1969, p. 461-486), largely based their conceptions on the 
viewpoints that contradicted the idea Radbruch famously imputed to the Nazi regime 
and its lawyers. In fact, fidelity to texts of the statutes was not, by far, a merit of the Nazi 
lawyers and legal philosophers (ZIMMERMANN, 2010, p. 221-232) (HALDMANN, 
2005, p. 162-178). The ultimate criterion of legal validity for them usually did not reside 
in literal texts of statutes or in the pretended will of lawmakers, but in the prevailing 
ideas of justice that decision-makers shall discover in the collective mentality, in the 
spirit of the people (nation). Following this line, Karl Schmitt famously defined the state 
as an entity that can rule on a state of exception and therefore its officials are entitled to 
overrule any positive enactments (SEITZER; THORNHILL, 2008, p. 1-50).  
But this Schmittian decisionism formed only one of the trends in sociological 
examination of law. Other trends in the sociological jurisprudence focused attention on 
such normative constraints in the social life that bind the state and other powerful 
organizations in their lawmaking activities. Several leading legal sociologists of the mid-
XXth century set out the ambitious task to examine law as an “ideal-realist” 
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phenomenon (GURVITCH, 1931) or as a combination of ethical and factual constraints 
coordinating human behaviour (TIMASHEFF, Nicholas, 2009) (TREVINO, 1998, 155-
202) (BANAKAR, 2003). This approach, in our opinion, stems, at least partly, from the 
ideas underpinning Eugen Ehrlich’s legal sociology which had been already outlined in 
the beginning of the XXth century (REHBINDER, 2005, p. 135-139). It can serve as an 
effective counter-balance to the preconceived ideals of social totality that enslave 
human beings to allegedly universal ideals and make individual choices dependent on 
collective strategies (one can think here about Auguste Comte’s idea of the society as 
of a Grand Être or Emile Durkheim’s conviction that the collective mentality supersedes 
every individual consciousness). Such a counter-balance is secured by certain 
epistemic elements incorporated into “ideal-realist” sociological theories of law, that 
allow splitting the abstract totality of society into innumerable sets of groups, 
communities, and factions, whose conventional standards are thus relativized and 
therefore may not claim to have universal validity (BANAKAR, 2002).  
In such a light these two philosophical conceptions,  the normative or 
analytical jurisprudence and the sociological jurisprudence,  can be examined as to 
their propensity or hostility to the human-rights discourse. The most important 
dimension here is that these conceptions fall into the field of legal positivism and, 
therefore, are based on relativist philosophies which supposedly exclude human-rights 
discourse from their domain. This supposition is rooted in the widely-shared (although 
erroneous, in our opinion) conviction according to which recognition of human rights is 
possible only when admitting certain objective (universal) values that underpin these 
rights (DONNELLY, 2007, p. 281-306) (GOODHART, 2008, p. 183-193).4 However, 
“the arrogant universalism of the powerful” is not a good tool for protection of human 
rights, as justly asserts Jack Donnelly who for that reason calls for a “relative 
universalism” (DONNELLY, 2007, p. 301).5 From this perspective, the fact that 
analytical and sociological conceptions of law are based on axiologically neutral 
assumptions may, on the contrary, provide balances that protect human individuality 
from enslavement to purportedly universal (objective) values and great narratives 
(MANELI, 1981, p. 101-115). 
                                                          
4
 See important debates on this issue: DONNELLY, 2007, p. 281-306; GOODHART, 2008, p. 183-193.  
5
 DONNELLY, 2007, p. 301 ff. Although, using this oxymoron of “relative universality” does not seem to be 
the best choice for arguing in favor of a flexibility in understanding of rights; and in this context we 
would prefer to speak plainly about relativity of human rights which, however, shall not be interpreted 
to diminish their utmost significance for the contemporary societies.  
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In order to investigate this dimension in the implicit discussions about 
fundamental rights in the pre-war positivist philosophy of law,6 we will address 
conceptions elaborated by two already mentioned Austrian scholars that largely 
outlined further development of analytical and sociological jurisprudence in the 
European legal philosophy.7 On the one hand, it is Hans Kelsen  the leader of legal 
positivism considered by some researchers as the “lawyer of the XXth century” 
(DREIER, 1993, p. 705-731),  and, on the other hand, it is Eugen Ehrlich who is 
generally considered to be the founding father of legal sociology. Kelsen had lived the 
terrific experience of the rise of Nazism in the late 1920-s and in 1930-s in Austria and 
Germany (he excitedly debated with Karl Schmitt (DREIER, 1999, p. 71-79) (PINELLI, 
2010, p. 493-504) (DYZENHAUS, p. 337-366) trying to defend liberal values in the law) 
and then fled to Switzerland and the US, resolutely condemning the practice and 
ideology of Nazism. Eugen Ehrlich died in 1922 and did not witness the ensuing 
atrocities of the Nazi regime (REHBINDER, 1978, 403-418), but having lived most of his 
professional life in the pluralistic society of Bukovina (NELKEN, 2008, p. 443-471), he 
felt the importance of guarantying minorities’ rights, which led him to the issue of 
constitutionalization of fundamental rights (MALISKA, 2015, p. 129-148).  
From this standpoint, Marcos Maliska is right when claiming that Ehrlich’s 
scientific and existential position was profoundly marked by democratic convictions and 
expressly favoured human freedoms. In fact, Ehrlich stressed that law does not emerge 
directly from the society or from any other Grand Être, and it cannot be mechanically 
moulded in societal relations: only after being considered and evaluated by individuals, 
certain social facts can bring about legal regulation through the intermediary of 
individual consciousness. Even if at some points Ehrlich shared objectivist sociological 
ideas of Emile Durkheim and his school, he has never accepted that social facts 
themselves could produce any objective normative regulation. In this sense, Ehrlich 
was rather closer to the Verstehende Soziologie of Max Weber. On the other hand, 
after having been for some time a follower of the Freirechtsschule (EHRLICH, 1967, p. 
                                                          
6
 We shall underscore once again that we reconstruct here this implicit discussion which in reality has not 
taken place, at least in the terms of fundamental (human) rights. Nonetheless, the respective 
methodological positions of Ehrlich and Kelsen, as we will try to demonstrate below, logically lead to 
certain conclusions about the value and the mechanisms of protection of human rights, which became 
patent in the post-war works of Hans Kelsen.  
7
 Even if it is true that Ehrlich has exercised much more influence on scholarly traditions in the US and in 
Japan than in Europe. At least, in the first half of the XXth century. See: ZIEGERT, 2009; VOGL, Stefan. 
2009, p. 95-124. 
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170-202) (RIEBSCHLAGER, 1968, p. 95-97), Ehrlich preferred to form his own socio-
legal conception which did not endorse purely individualist account of the law. In this 
perspective, the Czernowitz thinker was overtly sceptical about limitless judicial 
discretion and did not accept the idea that everything that comes from judges is the law 
(EHRLICH, 1917, p. 47-85) (REHBINDER, 1995, p. 191-202). For Ehrlich, judicial 
lawmaking is only a part of “the law of jurists”, which, in its turn, represents only a part 
of the law.  
In the following we will examine combination of the positivist methodology and 
the relativist axiology in the two legal conceptions elaborated respectively by Hans 
Kelsen and Eugen Ehrlich. We will try to determine which implications this combination 
could have for the issue of human rights, and to reassess relevance of these two legal 
conceptions for the contemporary theoretical debates about human rights. To this 
effect, we will first analyse the general situation in legal philosophy in the XIXth century, 
then will examine the basic principles of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law and Ehrlich’s 
legal sociology in order to draw some conclusions about how these conceptions can be 
engaged today in the human-rights discourse and about methodological advantages 
that can be expected from these theories in this discourse. 
 
3. THE EPISTEMIC CHALLENGES TO LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
One of advantages for reconsidering the intellectual heritage of Kelsen and 
Ehrlich in the view of the human rights issue resides in the pluralistic principles which 
imbue the both conceptions that are considered here. The pressing need for pluralism 
in various dimensions (methods, values, ideologies) at the end of the XIXth century was 
not only the concern of legal sciences. Accepting the view that the turn of the XIX/XX 
centuries was the period when the classical rationality with its linear schemes and 
monistic methodologies have been challenged and shattered by the new scientific 
revolution that brought the principle of relativity into the core of scientific research 
(HOLLIS; LUKES, 1982) (KUHN, 1970), it comes as no wonder that jurisprudence also 
needed new insights and ideas to get rid of the preconceived opinions. Legal 
philosophy could not stand aloof from the general development of sciences; and quite 
normally that the reconsideration of the methodological arsenal of the legal scholarship 
in the light of the new positive philosophy (elaborated mostly in the scope of hard 
sciences and, also, to some extent in social sciences) was on the agenda of legal 
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science in the first decades of the XXth century (BERMAN, 1983).  
This agenda in the law as in many other sciences implied, unlike two precedent 
centuries, relativization instead of any further rationalization of legal knowledge. One of 
the ways of this reconsideration was to apply some of the Neo-Kantian ideas in the 
province of jurisprudence. If accepted that neither nature, nor societies are subject to 
any immutable principles or laws that universally govern a linear evolution, then 
references to any necessary values or dimensions of law will inevitably appear as 
doubtful. These references shall be either held as culturally biased, or as merely 
conventional (BANAKAR, 2008, p. 151-175; 168-172). Rationalist explanatory schemes 
based on naturalist assumptions (implying that there are some natural laws which are 
hidden in the nature and await of someone who discovers them) failed to meet new 
challenges and to respond to the problems formulated in the scope of the hard sciences 
(HALL, 1970). If this thesis turned out to be true in hard sciences, also social sciences 
such as ethics or law moreover had to abandon the idea about some eternal precepts 
which are identical for every society and basing on which one could explain all about 
normativity (the traditional posture of the natural-law doctrines) (CARO, 2010). 
However, the question was not to do away with any epistemic certainty (even if some 
philosophers like Kierkegaard suggested it), but to refine and to relativize the principles 
of this certainty within the new paradigm of relativity (SANKEY, 1997, p. 149-184). 
However, if there are no universal truths or concepts, how then to secure 
coherence of thinking, to establish veracity of propositions, and how to explain binding 
force of law? Eugen Ehrlich and Hans Kelsen have proposed two exemplary, though 
different solutions to this epistemic conundrum in legal science. The former insisted that 
criteria of veracity of legal knowledge and of validity of legal rules reside in the social 
reality itself and, correspondingly, different social structures and environments provide 
for varying standards for defining what is right or wrong, true or false (ZIEGERT, 2014, 
p. 17-38). For the latter, there was no solution to this problem in empiric reality at all; 
and in order to tackle it, Kelsen proposed to relativize the issue of truth and of validity 
admitting that in the law no ultimate criterion can be formulated without falling in 
metaphysical fallacies. His was the idea to replace such criterion in the law by 
postulating that the starting point of legal thinking is a pure hypothesis or even a fiction, 
and therefore legal knowledge contains no universal truths  this was the main 
objective of Kelsen’s Grundnorm (KELSEN, 1959, p. 107-110). 
To understand relevance of these solutions, we shall consider the “archaeology 
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of legal knowledge” in the preceding century. The XIXth century had been the time 
when the natural-law jurisprudence based on metaphysical precepts started falling 
apart, provoking thereby the collapse of the traditional legal philosophy. This philosophy 
was rooted in the idealist method that sought to deduce some general principles from 
nature and to use them for evaluation of posited legal rules. This resulted in a dualism 
between the positive law and the natural law, the former being subordinated to the latter 
(WEINREB, 1987). In this perspective, nature served as a source of validity, so that 
posited legal rules used to be considered as binding only insofar as they corresponded 
to nature (it could reasonable, social, moral nature of man, or nature as the chain of 
causality). Respectively, positive legal rules were taken to be void if they were found 
irrational, unjust, or immoral. As to legal knowledge, truth about legal statements was 
also supposed to be deductible from assertions about some supreme truths and eternal 
principles governing nature and society, i.e. from the natural law (D'ENTREVES, 2009)  
(RICE, 1989, p.539-567).  
By that time, the main epistemic problem of the natural-law doctrines resided in 
the fact that they were not able to propose any objective criteria to uniformly and 
ultimately define rationality, justice, or morality. Almost each philosopher formulated 
what he considered to be immutable and eternal principles, basing these considerations 
on his own intuitive feeling of justice or, at best, on common sense. Quite expectedly, it 
turned out that even the common sense is different for various peoples and different 
époques, because it depends on human conditions and on the paradigms of rationality 
accepted in the given society. The natural-law doctrines, which had been dominating in 
jurisprudence before the XIXth century, could not stand this criticism: without forwarding 
claims to universality (be it universal morality or rationality) these conceptions were,to a 
considerable extent, devoid of sense.8  
In the XIXth century the natural-law doctrines have been attacked from two 
different sides. The initial attacks have been undertaken by the so called first positivists 
(Jeremy Bentham, John Austin and others) who insisted that the law is nothing but 
commands of a sovereign; what does not come from the sovereign and his will, is not 
legally binding and can be considered only as “positive morality”. There is no “law” in 
                                                          
8
 KELSEN, 1957, p. 137-173. A caveat is to be added here: in the present analysis we are limited by the 
mainstream natural-law doctrines and do not examine alternative versions of natural-law doctrines, from 
the so called revived natural law to the contemporary ius-naturalist thinkers such as John Finnis who 
relativized the concept of natural law and claimed to have thereby dissolved this conundrum. 
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general, but only the law (with a definitive article), which consists of legal rules, posited 
in the given country by the given sovereign. On the other hand, German proponents of 
the historical school of law (Carl Savigny, Georg Puchta and others) criticised the 
individualist approach of the natural-law doctrines (the approach that implies that 
someone, basing on his or her personal experience, defines what is rational, moral for 
everyone), and proposed to consider the law as a creation of the collective spirit 
(Volksgeist) which is the ultimate source of validity. In other words, if we want to know 
what the law of this country is, we shall examine the collective mentality prevalent in 
this country, how it expresses itself in customs, rites, cultural habits, and other informal 
regulations. The written law is only of secondary significance because it is only about 
the signs with the help of which are expressed the rules that already had existed before 
their positivation in the texts. Law is similar to language, it grows and develops in 
collective mentality and practice, so that legislators just fix what has already grown up 
spontaneously, like linguists just fix, describe and sometimes propose to ameliorate 
language uses. 
However, after the first enthusiasm had passed away, by the end of the XIXth 
century it became clear that these two conceptions (the positivist and the historicist 
ones) were unable to offer a more accurate account of the law than the natural-law 
doctrines did. Law cannot be conceived simply as a set of commands issued by a 
sovereign as this latter must first be defined through legal rules. At the same time, 
references to a will of a sovereign are nothing but metaphors because “sovereign” is 
just a common denominator for all those who are engaged in law-making process, who 
usually pursue diverging interests and goals and who, consequently, have no common 
will. Also the Volksgeist is rather a subjective projection, a wishful thinking of the 
conservatively minded philosophers who tried to discover in the collective mentality 
some immutable, transcendental values that take different forms in different historical 
eras but remain essentially the same, conserving particularity of each people. One of 
the last representatives of the historical school of law, Karl Beseler, underscored this 
idealist dimension with particular clarity (REIMANN, 1990, 837-897; 869-875).  
It is at that time of the crisis of the natural-law doctrines, of the historical school 
and of the first legal positivism and its continuators (l’école d’exégèse in France, 
Begriffsjurisprudenz in Germany, etc.) that Kelsen and Ehrlich have written their first 
influential works (KELSEN, 1911a) (EHRLICH, 1913), which gradually became topical 
for heated discussions among legal philosophers of that time. To be mentioned en 
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passant that this crisis has provoked similar reactions not only in the German-speaking 
scientific community but also in other communities. As examples can be cited the US 
legal scholars who at that time developed their research in a similar way: Christopher 
Langdell or Wesley Hohfeld, Oliver Holmes Jr. or Roscoe Pound (LIKHOVSKI, 2003, p. 
621-657), Russian legal philosophers such as Nicolai Korkunov or Leon Petrazycki ( 
COTTERREL, 2015, p. 1-16). But we will leave these examples aside and turn to the 
epistemic conceptions elaborated by the two Austrian legal thinkers.  
At the outset of the XXth century, such philosophers as Ernest Mach 
demonstrated that under the guise of objective principles of cognition scholars deal with 
their own subjective convictions, that may seem self-evident within the given common-
sense frameworks, but which however are not universal (COHEN, 1994, p. 37-45). The 
pretended objectivity turned out to be a sophisticated subjectivity hidden behind the 
prevailing common sense that endorses preconceived opinions in concrete societies. 
For Kelsen, as for Ehrlich,  both were under the evident influence of Mach’s 
philosophy (LIKHOVSKI, p. 48-71),  the main problem of legal knowledge resided in 
the metaphysical assumptions on which were based the methods traditionally used by 
legal scholars. These assumptions implied that the law has an immutable ideal 
dimension composed of absolute values or truths. It is true also for the first positivism 
as evidently based on the assumption that order, security and certainty absolutely 
prevail over all other values and thereby justify the absolute power of the sovereign and 
the ensuing obligation of the citizenry to accept everything that goes from the sovereign 
(PRIEL, 2011).  
Such value absolutism had its counterpart in the one-sided vision of the law 
reduced to one principle, be it power, justice, collective mentality, and so on. Both 
Ehrlich and Kelsen argued against this one-dimensional understanding of the law and 
called, although in different terms, for more pluralism in legal sciences.9 Pluralism in this 
context signifies both methodological and axiological pluralism, the first protecting 
human knowledge from biases and aberrations, and the second shielding human self-
determination from imposed values. In this way, as it will be shown in the next section, 
Kelsen and Ehrlich have significantly helped to formulate the new agenda for the legal 
                                                          
9
 Kelsen’s idea to construct legal science basing only one method (imputation) can appear to refute this 
thesis. However, as it will be demonstrated in the next section, this Neo-Kantian perspective does not 
mean that other dimensions are irrelevant for cognition of the law  Kelsen’s approach implied just a 
more accurate distinction between methods and scholarly discipline, without excluding the possibility 
of cooperation between these disciplines and combination of various methods in studying the law.  
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philosophy in the XXth century. 
 
4. THE METHODOLOGICAL RESPONSES BY KELSEN AND EHRLICH 
 
We will start with Kelsen who is justly qualified as “the lawyer of the XXth 
century” because of the immense influence of his ideas on positivistic-minded legal 
scholars. Unlike the most civil-law legal philosophers, he succeeded to get quite well 
known and discussed also in the Anglo-Saxon world. Kelsen’s radical program was to 
purify the legal science from odd and unnecessary elements, which blur our vision of 
the law (STEWART, 1990, p. 273-308). Legal science, as asserted Kelsen, was imbued 
with value judgments hidden behind the pretended objectivity of the moral obligation to 
obey legal rules. Such apology of the moral obligation led to syncretism, as legal 
propositions (Rechtssätze), from this vantage point, should have been understood as 
consisting of heterogeneous elements (the will of the rulers, values and maxims, factual 
behaviour). On the other hand, such prevalence of disguised evaluations finally results 
in ideologization of this science. It is normal that some believe that the law is about 
justice, common good, or justified interests, some say that the law is about solidarity, 
some suppose that the law is about special empathic emotions, and so on. The problem 
is not with these beliefs, but with the fact that such thinkers tend to consider their beliefs 
to be objective truths. What is then wrong with the legal science? Kelsen’s reply was – 
the mystification resulting in syncretism (EBENSTEIN, 1971, p. 167-652).  
As a Neo-Kantian, Kelsen believed that each science has its own method, and 
that of jurisprudence shall not be confused with methods of sociology, ethics or 
psychology which can also study the law, but from other standpoints that are irrelevant 
for lawyers concerned with validity of legal rules (PAULSON, 1992, p. 311-332). Basing 
on the Kantian distinction between Is (Sein) and Ought (Sollen), the Austrian thinker 
asserted that this unique method for establishing validity was the method of imputation. 
Kelsen explains (KELSEN, 1950, p. 1-11) that when a sociologist or psychologist 
observes some facts, he or she explains them through the principle of causality. So, if it 
is supposed that when the average level of life drops down, it usually leads to rise of 
criminality rate because some people cannot earn their bread otherwise than 
committing crimes, etc. This is one way to describe the legal phenomena. Another way 
is to ascribe liability. If someone steals, he or she shall be punished with imprisonment 
of so many years: this ascription does not depend on any regularity and does not 
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describe any factual state of affairs.  
For Kelsen, the difference is decisive: in the first case we just utter statements of 
facts, and in the second case we ascribe to a behavioural act some legal consequences 
that shall follow this act. The fact that lawyers usually fail to make difference between 
these two different situations is the cause of grave mistakes and misunderstandings, 
the most dangerous of which consists in bringing ideology into the province of the law. 
The task of the legal science is to connect certain facts with their sequences as 
established in legal texts, or in other words, to impute these sequences to such facts; all 
the rest goes beyond the borders of jurisprudence and falls within the scope of other 
disciplines such as sociology, psychology, or ethics. With this unique method of 
imputation, the legal science is self-sufficient and does not need to address other 
sciences in order to explain validity of the law and understand the specific modus 
vivendi of the law (the binding character of legal rules) (LANGFORD, 2013, p. 85-110).  
Traditionally, in order to justify the binding force of the law, lawyers sought for 
moral principles, religious dogmas, or social facts (like that of solidarity or 
reasonableness) that make people believe that they are under the obligation to obey 
certain posited legal rules and to respect the axiomatic principles that underpin these 
rules. In Kelsen’s view, this moral absolutism disrupts methodological purity of 
jurisprudence. He contended that validity or the binding force of the law can be 
described with the help of legal rules themselves. This is inevitably circular, but this is 
the way lawyers think about the law (here Kelsen meant mainly continental lawyers) 
(GREEN, 2003, p. 365-413). We obey and execute judicial decisions because someone 
called “judge” has the competence to authoritatively settle disputes and his or her 
decisions, therefore, have obligatory character. This competence is derived from certain 
legal rules (be they fixed in procedural codes or in substantive laws), which, in their 
turn, are valid insofar as they are voted by a parliament; the parliament is empowered 
to pass laws if it is created and acting in accordance with the constitution; the 
constitution is valid if it is adopted in the way prescribed by the former constitution. 
Finally, we come to the historically first constitution, which serves as the first 
empowerment. No matter if this constitution has ever existed in reality: for legal thinking 
it is not important as it simply needs a starting point in order to coherently explain the 
legal order and its validity (BINDREITER, 2003). 
Here comes the hypothesis of a basic norm (Grundnorm) as a shortcut for this 
first constitution. This basic norm is just a hypothesis or, as Kelsen concedes later, a 
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fiction or something that is presupposed but does not exist in reality. Such a 
presupposition is inevitable for Kelsen to perceive the law in the specific legal manner 
and purify it from ideology (PAULSON, 2000, p. 279-293). Another question is whether 
Kelsen’s own conception was free from ideological stances. His critics insisted that 
similar ideological stances were present also in the Pure Theory of Law, showing that 
Kelsen evidently favoured certainty in the law (as some assert, with prejudice to justice 
(ROONEY, 1948, p. 140-172) and that his basic norm had striking resemblance with 
some metaphysical presuppositions of natural law.10 But this question falls out of the 
scope of the present paper.  
With the help of these two key concepts (imputation and basic norm), Kelsen 
arrives to construct legal science as an independent discipline and supposedly purify it 
from evaluations and biases. In spite of the frequently occurring misunderstanding, 
Kelsen’s theory was exactly about purification of legal knowledge and not about 
purification of the law itself. The Austrian thinker was far from contending that the law is 
made only of rules: he explicitly admitted that also ideas, social facts, politics are 
important to understand what the law is and how it functions in reality (KELSEN, 1257, 
p. 1-24). But examining the law from these standpoints is not in the province of the legal 
science, which has to examine the law only in the perspective of imputation. 
Nonetheless, it does not preclude multi-disciplinary research in the law, or combination 
of methods in the scope of particular projects. 
This short description of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law,  the theory that has 
already been sketched by its author in the first decades of the XXth century,  allows 
figuring out what could have been be the annoyance of Kelsen when his compatriot, 
Eugen Ehrlich, had published in 1913 his Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of 
Law. The main idea of this book was to show that the law is tantamount to the social 
order, or better: to the multiplicity of orders that exist in various social groups and 
communities. The law works to coordinate social relations, to attribute to individuals 
their places in the social structure; and this jural coordination is not a function of 
someone’s will.11 The society coordinates itself, more precisely – it is various social 
groups that shape their own forms, borders, structures, and relations within themselves 
                                                          
10
 See the criticism of the ius-naturalist inclinations of Kelsen in the writings of his contemporaries: 
SANDER, 1928, p. 507 ff.; HORVATH, 1930, p. 531 ff.; ROSS,1961, v. 4, p. 46-90 
11
 “The inner order of the associations of human beings is not only the original, but also, down to the 
present time, the basic form of law” (EHRLICH, Eugen, 2002, p. 77).  
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and with other groups in the constant flux of communication (ZIEGERT, 1979, p. 225-
273). Ehrlich explains: the law lies in the very foundations of the social order and is a 
constitutive part of this order, so that social life (which per definitionem is an organized 
life) is impossible without the law. When amidst the social spontaneity arises some 
more or less constant relations, when these relations acquire a relative stability, when 
this stability is somehow reflected and justified in human minds, we can, following 
Ehrlich, state that the law works in this social milieu (REHBINDER, 1986).  
What is then the law? Ehrlich proposes many examples from history and 
ethnology to show that what we call the law is a sum of certain facts. In every society 
there are some basic “facts of the law” (Tatsachen des Rechts) such as possession, 
domination, usage and declaration of will (EHRLICH, p. 123). These vital human 
interactions are regulated everywhere, although differently  because of the difference 
in social conditions. Studying these facts and the factors that influence them in the 
given society is the proper subject-matter of legal science. Ehrlich argues: if we meet a 
voyager who visited a remote country, we ask him how marriages are concluded there, 
how can one enter into a valid contract or make a will, but we hardly ever would ask him 
what paragraphs of the statutes are that contain the rules on marriage, contract, or 
testament. These legal propositions also have significance for legal science, but stand 
in the second place: first, we need to know what the living law is. In fact, the living law 
and the official law can prescribe different behavioural acts, and quite frequently people 
prefer to obey the living law and to disregard the official law (ZIEGERT, 2009, p. 223-
236). The analytical jurisprudence is wrong when confines itself only to examination of 
the official law and its prescriptions; the most important thing for lawyers and for 
ordinary people is exactly the living law which practically binds human behavior 
(FRIEDMAN, 1977).  
Stressing the constitutive and primordial character of legal facts, Ehrlich writes 
“The state existed before the constitution; the family is older than the order of the family; 
possession antedates ownership; there were contracts before there was a law of 
contracts; and even the testament, where it is of native origin, is much older than the 
law of last wills and testaments” (EHRLICH, p. 35-36). He argues that doctrinal lawyers 
are wrong when denying validity of the social conventions that shape human behaviour, 
because if we want to predict real consequences and their impact on strategies of 
human beings, we need also encompass these unwritten conventions: habits, usages, 
traditions. Ultimately, it is in these conventions that Ehrlich searches for sources of 
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validity of the law. This idea underpins the famous diction of Ehrlich placed in the 
Foreword to his opus of 1913: "At the present as well as at any other time, the centre of 
gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, not in judicial 
decision, but in society itself" (EHRLICH, p.15).  
It is easy to see that the conceptions of Kelsen and Ehrlich were based on 
significantly diverging methodological principles, and there is no wonder that a couple 
years after this publication these two scholars entered into debates. These debates 
were published in two issues of one German journal in 1915 and 1916 (KELSEN; 
EHRLICH, 2003). Two main reproaches of Kelsen were that Ehrlich did not see 
difference between the law, on the one hand, and morality, religion, and other regulative 
mechanisms of society that bring about the social order, and, on the other hand, that 
Ehrlich did not respect the irreconcilable gap between Is and Ought, deducing 
mandatory rules from factual behaviour. Ehrlich tried to defend his position offering 
psychological criteria for differentiation between law, morality, and etiquette; he also 
insisted that some legal phenomena cannot be explained without reference to the 
factual behaviour (like the customary law) and this reference does not imply 
amalgamation of causality and modality.12 But he seemingly has lost the debates 
because of the chosen strategy of reiterating terminological issues and avoiding 
substantial discussion, while Kelsen had challenged the very foundations of the legal 
sociology (VAN KLINK, p. 127-156).  
After the debates had been over, Ehrlich re-elaborated the chief ideas of his 
legal sociology, conceding much more attention to legal statements (propositions), to 
the judicial application of the law, and to analytical jurisprudence  this is patent in his 
two later works, published in 1917-1918 (EHRLICH, 1917, p. 1-80) (EHRLICH, 1925). 
The turbulence of the years of the First World War and of the following years impeded 
the Bukovina legal scholar to finalize the revision of his socio-legal conception, and 
Ehrlich’s premature death in 1922 put the end on further development of his 
methodological project (REHBINDER, 2005, p.140-146). As to Kelsen, he has lived a 
longer life and in the 1940-s he has considerably revised his ideas about the Is and 
Ought divide, inquiring more profoundly in factual conditions for normative regulation in 
different societies (KELSEN, 1941).13  
                                                          
12
 In this aspect, there is no unbridgeable gulf between the ideas of Kelsen and the conception of Ehrlich. 
See: ANTONOV, 2011, p. 5-21. 
13
 Compare with Kelsen’s initial position: KELSEN, 1911(b).  
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These two thinkers offered the insights that became the guidelines for the 
discussions between the Western legal philosophers throughout the XXth century. One 
of the main contributions of Kelsen was his consecutive criticism against the dogmatic 
idea of mechanical application of legal rules: no rule can in advance foretell what will be 
peculiarities of a concrete situation and how the judge shall decide on this situation 
(PAULSON, 2008, p. 7-39). That is why legal rules are only frameworks that are filled 
with regulatory prescriptions by judges who create individual legal directives and 
thereby definitively regulate behaviour of the parties to a court case. With the help of 
this idea of dynamic legal order and of the continued law-creation, which is at the same 
time the law-application, Kelsen resolutely rejects ideological schemes of the traditional 
jurisprudence such as the distinction between public and private law, between 
subjective and objective law. In his turn, Ehrlich has shown that legal regulation in 
society is not based on some transcendental values but is in the process of contact flux, 
is constantly reshaping itself  is an autopoietic process, if to employ the modern 
terminology. For him, the law is about the question of a momentary equilibrium of social 
forces, interests, and ideas; this is what brings about the social order, even if this order 
is subject to further spontaneous modifications. But this equilibrium is not everything 
about law, as legal regulation appears only after human beings connect a factual state 
of affairs with their previous experience and with their ideas about justice, and after this 
combination is ascertained in what is considered to be sources of law in the given 
society. 
 
5. EHRLICH AND KELSEN IN THE HUMAN-RIGHTS DISCOURSE 
 
Such a methodological posture of these two thinkers was favourable to advance 
of human rights for several reasons which we will enumerate in the following. This 
enumeration does not pretend to be exhaustive and our purpose here is merely to draw 
attention to this dimension of the work of Kelsen and Ehrlich.  
If we take these conceptions of these two Austrian legal thinkers to illustrate how 
human rights were conceived in their relations to the state and its sovereignty, it is not 
because these thinkers are famous of their work in this field. Rather, on the contrary, 
Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law was, as shown above, often reputed to be the 
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stronghold of the exclusive (or hard) positivism which rules out the very possibility of 
any supra-legal principles that supersede the posited legal enactments. Also Ehrlich’s 
legal sociology can be easily misinterpreted as a denial of democracy and 
constitutionalism because of its focus on facticity. Taken in the sense of the famous 
sociological Schmittean criticism directed against formal normativity of the law and 
favouring indeterminacy of political decision (ROTTLEUTHNER, 1983, p. 20-35), 
Ehrlich’s conception could have been interpreted as a threat to human rights. But both 
these interpretations would be incorrect.  
As we have insisted in this paper, Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law did not intend to 
strip the law of its ideal dimension and to ban from its province all value judgments. For 
the Austrian legal scholar, the law is a technique of enforcement of peaceful co-
existence of human beings, none of which is entitled to impose his or her views or 
values on other people. All people living in society are equally subordinated to the law, 
no matter what are values they praise more (justice, certainty, equality, peace…), and 
the law shall be applied equally to all. This dimension of the law is described by Kelsen 
as the static aspect. In reality this aspect is often thwarted by individual choices made 
by judges who consider cases differently, consciously or unconsciously preferring 
certain values and, correspondingly, providing the same legal texts with different 
interpretations. It is clear that concrete judges of flesh and blood, following their own 
ethical credos, tend to prioritize different values when adjudicating. This is the dynamic 
aspect of the law.  
  Kelsen is reputed to be a relentless critic of natural-law doctrines and similar 
metaphysical ideas about a non-posited law as a purported criterion of validity of the 
posited law. Nonetheless, this criticism of metaphysical stances in law did not preclude 
Kelsen from formulating certain ideas that are compatible with the contemporary 
conception of human rights and are important for it (INGRAM, 2014, p. 237-267). On 
the one hand, his philosophy exceptionally favours legal certainty and peaceful 
coexistence which are cornerstones for protection of human rights. On the other hand, 
Kelsen indicates at the principle of relativity that guarantees human freedom which 
includes also the freedom to balance and to range different values.  
This approach yields a viable conception of democracy which can be stable, in 
Kelsen’s opinion, only in the situation of value pluralism. In its turn, it is this pluralism 
that underpins the value of human individuality and protects human autonomy from 
totalitarian pretentions based on such ideas as social solidarity or public good 
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(KELSEN, 1920) (KELSEN, 1955, p.1-101). Therefore, only positive philosophy can 
make someone free, liberate him or her from the moral authority of supra-individual 
totalities such as Society, State and the like. Contrary to the widespread opinion, 
Kelsen did not claim that justice shall make no part of the law  his requirement of 
purity concerns only the legal science which shall be value-free when examining the 
law, and does not concern the law as such. He explicitly admitted that application and 
interpretation of the law undoubtedly involves also legal values such as justice or equity 
(KELSEN, 1957).  
As to Eugen Ehrlich, at the first sight his legal sociology excludes any ideal 
dimension that stands above the customary law, the living (soft) law, the official 
(statutory) law and the law of jurists. For Ehrlich, existence (the binding force) of law 
does not depend on any personal or supra-personal value judgments  it derives from 
certain implicit societal conventions embodied in practical behaviour and in minds of 
human beings. The very facticity of law guarantees that under certain conditions 
(repeated application, opinio necessitatis, congruence with the social structure of the 
given community) it will be transformed into normativity, as Ehrlich seemed to assert in 
his Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1913), following the idea of Georg 
Jellinek about “normative force of the factual” (JELLINEK, 1960, p. 308). Law is 
therefore a set of constraints that each societal community elaborates to keep itself 
integrated and to distribute rights and obligations among its members.  
In this perspective, law grows from the facticity and reaffirms the factual links that 
are already existent in the societal environment, providing these links with the 
normative (binding) force (ANTONOV, 2013a, p. 263-272). Such an environment can 
be propitious to protection of individual freedoms, or not, but in any case the regulation 
created in this environment will be binding, no matter how its contents be evaluated 
from the standpoint of protection of human freedom. Therefore, the law as facticity will 
preserve the binding force, even if its posited enactments overtly violate human rights 
(ANTONOV, 2013b, p. 287-313). But this does not necessarily mean that human rights 
are irrelevant from the standpoint of legal sociology. As shown above, Ehrlich’s 
conception of the living law underscores legal pluralism that carries out the same 
function as the methodological and value pluralism in Kelsen’s conception. To wit, this 
legal pluralism (implying a multitude of social orders, groups, regulations, organs, 
opinion and values) conceptually impedes any authority or totality interfering with 
personal value choice and superposes its value over the value of individual human 
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being, constraining his/her freedoms for the sake of protection of any superior values. 
However, this interference can take place in real life where the pluralism is subjugated 
to authoritative practices of regulation and governance.   
One of the main epistemic difficulties of human rights is connected with 
uncertainty of the sources of their validity and with delimitating their exact limits. Kelsen 
and Ehrlich implicitly proposed quite original replies which have analytical 
consequences for fundamental rights and which differ quite substantially from the 
supposed disclaimer of human rights generally attributed to legal positivists and legal 
sociologists. If, following Ehrlich, we admit that the law derives its validity from personal 
convictions and societal implicit conventions, the very machinery of the law cannot 
normally function without addressing and considering these convictions and 
conventions. Human rights are quite a new instrument of the contemporary Western 
societies hardly conceivable in the Antiquity or in the Middle Ages, and even nowadays 
stumbling in non-Western countries. In the contemporary societies (at least, in what is 
called “the civilized nations”) the empowerment of authorities to create law is generally 
linked to the conventionally accepted idea that this empowerment is valid only to the 
extent it does not contravene the basic rights. What are such rights, how they shall be 
balanced, where are their limits and what is their correct interpretation  all this is 
subject to particularities of local legal cultures and to local/regional normative 
frameworks (ANTONOV, 2013c, p. 15-30).  
As to Kelsen, if one assert that human rights are presupposed in the way the 
basic norm is presupposed, then human rights can be said to stay hanging in the air as 
pure hypotheses or fictions. On the one hand, this objection is partly true because for 
Kelsen human rights, as any rights and obligations whatsoever, are not natural kinds 
and cannot be found somewhere in nature or in society. All the edifice of the law, in this 
sense, hangs in the air or, more correctly, is just a model of thinking (Denkenbild) that 
allows human beings to authoritatively coordinate their mutual behaviour acting as if 
(als ob  in the sense of Vaihinger’s philosophy (VAIHINGER,1924) there were a basic 
norm. Accepting that their behaviour is subject to legal rules, human beings agree to 
follow the rules as if they were established pursuant to what is the constitution (written 
or, more often, unwritten) of their society. If this constitution includes certain guarantees 
of individual freedoms, they shall be respected, whatever are feelings of people about 
these freedoms (it happens quite frequently and even in the Western societies that 
some rights or freedoms are not approved of by the majority), what are opinions of the 
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ruling elites about practicability of protecting certain minorities, and what the difference 
is between the “law in books” on human rights and the “law in action”.  
It follows, from another perspective, that in the case of a normative conflict 
between the national and the international law on human rights, the latter will take 
precedence because it is supposed to be the source of validity for rules of national law. 
Kelsen has famously advocated in favour of monist system putting the international law 
above the national law, insofar as only international law can define the limits of state 
and its sovereign rights, including the right to legislate. If efficacy of protection of human 
rights in the given country depends on what system (monist or dualist) this country 
adheres to? This question is very complicated and cannot be addressed here, as well 
as the question about subsidiary or primordial role of international courts in defending 
human rights. However, we can suppose that generally international law and 
international courts normally provide more guarantees (at least, some additional 
guarantees) to individual freedoms, and, in this respect, Kelsen’s conception is 
favourable to protection of human rights.  
Ehrlich has remained rather silent on the issue of priority of the monist or the 
dualist systems. But two important considerations can be taken into account here. 
Firstly, Ehrlich reiterated that the state law may not claim to have supreme validity and 
its effect is, in the final resort, dependent on how the state law is accepted, interpreted 
and applied in communities. Given this, societal conventions on human rights normally 
shall triumph over the state law and its restrictions, regardless of what are the concerns 
about sovereignty and its limits. Secondly, the international law is essentially akin to 
customary law; it establishes as binding what has been followed so far by the states in 
their mutual relations and what is admitted in the international community. In this sense, 
the international law is created by the international community, and Ehrlich’s theory can 
be construed here to provide a similar response: the state shall not interfere with the 
internal life and regulation of communities. 
The same considerations can be applied to the question of parliamentary 
sovereignty which sometimes is utilized to defend the state from interferences with its 
legislative policies (in a broad sense including also the law made by courts and 
administration), even if such policies considered to contravene human rights.14 In the 
light of Kelsen’s thesis about coincidence of law and state, insofar as the state is a 
synonym for centralized legal order, there is no analytical possibility to oppose the 
                                                          
14
 As an example, can be cited the situation in Russia: ANTONOV, 2014, p. 1-40.  
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parliamentary sovereignty and the (human) rights (KELSEN, 1920). This opposition 
turns out to be one of the erroneous ideological dualisms that Kelsen attempted to 
overcome in his Pure Theory of Law. Opposing rights and sovereignty is the same 
ideological fallacy as opposing state and law, public and private law, and so on. 
Consequently, sovereignty is nothing but another word to describe the self-referential 
character of the law which prescribes rules for its own creation and application, and is 
itself the source of its own validity. Taken in this perspective, parliamentary sovereignty 
cannot be utilised to impose constraints on fundamental rights, because it simply 
indicates at the specific modality of reproduction of legal rules containing, among other 
rights and obligations, also fundamental rights sheltering human freedom. Analytically, 
therefore, there can be no contradiction between such rights and sovereignty, because 
they both are signs of the same normative reality  the legal order and its circular 
scheme of validity. 
Ehrlich did not write any works specifically dealing with the issue of parliamentary 
sovereignty, but the general logic of his conception leads to the conclusion that 
sovereignty cannot gain over pluralistic society, its communities and legal orders. 
Sovereignty can be important only in the aspect of state legal order which, as fervently 
insists Ehrlich, has not any preestablished precedence over other legal orders of 
society. If the issue of prevalence of state legal order and other legal orders is decided 
in the view of their respective authority over behaviour of those who are subject to 
them, then sovereignty has no normative weight to tip the scale when the state legal 
order collides with other orders.  
One more aspect is connected with the application of the law. Kelsen assumed 
that this is a continued process and that is why legal rules cannot be “applied” in the 
very sense of this verb. Rules are created or, in other words, endowed with meaning, at 
every stage of application. Therefore, what matters for the protection of human rights 
are not written texts but rather mentality of judges (here and below “judges” include also 
other law-officers)  the way how they make a link between the factual situation and 
the first constitution (the basic norm) that endorses to reinterpret and apply rules. In this 
view, so called “statutory injustice” and the “Gesetz ist Gesetz” principle do not 
determine the factual behaviour of judges and their decisions: every judge is at the 
same time a decision-maker and a lawmaker who is responsible for the meaning he or 
she attributes to the rule (it means for Kelsen: “creates the rule”) to be applied in this 
given situation. Formal legal rules provide for a framework to be filled in by judges. 
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Surely, this can be a very dangerous trump for judges, which can transform “rule of law” 
into gouvernment des juges. But, on the other side, this approach reveals the real 
power possessed by judges and, by this fact, justifies the greatest responsibility of 
judges for the outcome of court proceedings. Here, a judge is not a puppet speaking the 
words of the law (to remind of Montesquieu’s celebrated metaphor), but the real master 
of legal system who cannot excuse his or her wrong decisions referring to bad laws.  
Similar remarks can be made about Ehrlich’s sociology of law. In this sociology 
the real power does not belong to parliaments which can create “dead norms” or, at 
best, give some very general instructions which shall be implemented in the way 
corresponding to the practical uses and conventions accepted in the given community. 
Here sociology of law works for providing the factual material needed for further 
interpretation, application of laws, which ultimately means  for remodelling these 
laws. Statutes are very imprecise instruments and their utilization in every situation 
requires that judge considers also the bulk of legal documents, factual engagements 
and other sources which help to discover what the living law for this community is, and 
which interpretation shall be given to the respective statutory provisions.  
This approach to parliamentary sovereignty can have an ambiguous effect. On 
the one side, in a “sound” community even unjust rules will be applied in the way this 
community protects the freedom of human beings. On the other side, a “sick” 
community with an underdeveloped (or, putting it more smoothly, non-Western) legal 
culture can obstruct working of the formally recognized instruments (constitution or/and 
international treaties). This is something that happens frequently in some 
underdeveloped non-Western countries, where the instruments for protection of human 
rights remain largely idle because of unpreparedness on the part of the population to 
use them. In a similar prism can be considered the question about constitutional review; 
the very idea of such review is intrinsically connected with the presumption that statutes 
are not the supreme source of legal regulation in society. This implies that courts have 
to address societal conventions or the hypothetical foundations of their legal order to 
check how the statute in question is embedded into this legal order. Not by a 
coincidence Kelsen became the founding father of the continental model of 
constitutional review.  
Here arises another dimension which is important in the prism of protection of 
human rights. If some peoples are underdeveloped and do not recognize human rights, 
are other peoples (the “civilized nations”) entitled to impose such rights? The debates 
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about purposes and failures of the so called “responsibility to protect” inevitably 
endanger the authority of human rights: these rights, their claim to universality quite 
often fall under the criticism when condemning the “humanitarian interventions” in 
Libya, Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Which solutions can be found in the conceptions of 
Kelsen and Ehrlich to these challenges? Their conceptions are designed in the way to 
mitigate such problematization through relativization of the issue of sovereignty, also in 
the sense of the “parliamentary sovereignty”. For Ehrlich each community elaborates 
organic rules (“the living law”) for organization of its internal life, and in their peaceful 
collaboration these communities create the normative web of legal regulation in the 
entire society. For Kelsen, even if the state may establish some rules and principles in 
the texts of statutes, it is up to judge to attribute the due meaning to these texts in the 
light of the concrete situation, considering the ultimate goal of the law: to set up a 
peaceful coexistence. In this perspective, interventions and interferences constitute 
something abnormal for legal regulation which in an ordinary situation comes from 
below (i.e., it is communities  for Ehrlich, or judges  for Kelsen) who create the 
really binding rules. Here sovereignty seems to benefit from the both conceptions, 
although sovereignty is not supposed to be absolute.  
As justly mentions Petra Gumplova, “Law in Kelsen’s theory has this unique 
double normative purpose: it enables a peaceful, nonviolent arbitration of conflicts both 
between individuals and the states, and it preserves individual freedom to the largest 
extent possible, especially when organized in conformity with principles and institutions 
of constitutional democracy”. This means that the law is justified insofar as it secures 
the peaceful coexistence of individual and states, and the purpose of functioning of the 
machinery of the law resides exactly in such securing. In the spectre of the monist 
system advocated by Kelsen, human rights as ius cogens of the contemporary 
international law prime over rules of the state law. The international law, therefore, 
indirectly endorses coercive intervention inhuman policies of the sovereign states, but 
this law still lacks effective dispute-resolution organs and enforcement bodies to secure 
the protection of the internationally recognized human rights. That is why Kelsen 
aspired for establishing a world legal order, a civitas maxima, that would effectively 
secure enforcing a peaceful protection of human rights (ZOLO, 1998, p. 306-324). Even 
if this project of Kelsen (along with his conception of democracy and formal normativity) 
is qualified by some scholars as “utopia of legality”(VINX, 2008, p. 66-68), it still 
remains an important topic for discussions among international lawyers.  
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 As to Ehrlich, he was critical about all attempts of state authorities to interfere 
with internal legal regulation in communities. Equally, it is expectable that no 
intervention of the “civilized nations” into a national legal order (for regime-change or 
other purposes) composed out of communitarian legal orders will be legitimate because 
such interventions would putatively endanger the normal functioning of the law in these 
societies. This happens nowadays in Iraq, Libya and in some other countries. Although, 
in certain circumstances interference can be welcomed, e.g., in what concerns 
protection of (national, religious, cultural and other) minorities and provided that such an 
interference is not destructive for the concerned society. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
 Above we have attempted to outline the main methodological and epistemic 
properties of the legal conceptions of Hans Kelsen and Eugen Ehrlich in the light of 
their presumed relevance for the human-rights discussions in the contemporary world. 
This relevance is examined against the background of the principle of sovereignty that 
is nowadays often used to restrict interventions into policies of the states. Universalist 
claims seem to lay in the foundation of human rights which strive to be the superior 
criteria for assessment of laws and policies of the states. Sovereignty in its classical, 
Westphalian sense potentially can encounter these claims and even rebuff them 
referring to the power of discretion or, to put it more mildly, margin of appreciation that 
allows to national governments to decide about the limits that can be allocated for rights 
and obligations of their citizens and for cooperation with international courts and other 
supra-national bodies. Two conceptions examined above offer a nuanced and careful 
account of the ways the law is created in society. Ehrlich and Kelsen proposed to 
combine several perspectives,  methodological, epistemic, axiological,  which 
enhances a multifaceted approach to the law and, at the same time, such philosophical 
perspective that secures human autonomy and freedom from “great narratives” and 
governmental interventions. This perspective opens a variety of opportunities for better 
understanding of the balance between individual and collective interests, between the 
significance of rights and sovereignty. We have tried to sketch the most important 
dimensions in which these theories can be useful for the contemporary legal science. 
Our objective here was to suggest and to argue that the legal conceptions of Ehrlich 
and Kelsen are still actual for the debates in the fields of international or constitutional 
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law, and legal philosophy about the limits of human rights and about epistemic 
conditions for identifying these rights, for understanding how these rights are the same 
time can claim for a universal character and remain culturally embedded. The principle 
and the value of relativity that underpins the Pure Theory of Law of Kelsen and the legal 
sociology of Ehrlich are of particular importance for discussing the “relative universality” 
(Jack Donnelly) of human rights. Relativity of human rights and of the values that 
underlie them does not impede from recognizing and protecting these rights, provided 
that they are taken for what they really are: a set of normative instruments based on the 
socially accepted standards and rooted into the foundation of the Western-type legal 
orders. The theories considered above, suggest many insights about the way human 
rights be understood as relative, but fundamental norms. 
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